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NEW EVIDENCE FOR THE BROAD VIEW: RECONSIDERING
THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE IN INDIVIDUAL-DEBTOR
CHAPTER 11 CASES POST-SBRA
Justin J. Maroni*
INTRODUCTION
Honest but unfortunate debtors who find themselves in financial distress may seek
relief under the United States Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”).1 Chapter 11 of the Code
is specifically designed to promote the successful reorganization of distressed business
entities (though not limited exclusively to business entities) by affording debtors “a
‘financial breathing spell’ from most creditor collection efforts.”2 Under the
protections of Chapter 11, such as the automatic stay, debtors can continue business
operations while formulating a plan of reorganization to repay creditors.3 Confirming
a plan of reorganization is typically the primary goal in a Chapter 11 case.4 Once a
plan is proposed, “the plan is voted upon by the debtor’s creditors, and the bankruptcy
court must make certain findings (e.g., the plan was proposed in good faith and it
complies with specified payment priorities).”5 “If the court is satisfied, then the plan
is confirmed and the debtor is no longer in Chapter 11.”6 If the case is unsuccessful
however—i.e., the debtor is unable to confirm a plan—then the case will either be
converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy or dismissed, whichever is in the best interests of
the creditors and the bankruptcy estate.7 Ultimately, the provisions of Chapter 11 are
designed to foster, not frustrate, the reorganization and economic well-being of the
debtor. This fundamental principle should apply equally whether the debtor is a
corporation or an individual.
Although Chapter 11 was unquestionably designed with large businesses in mind,
individual debtors are also eligible to file for Chapter 11 relief.8 In fact, the ABI
Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 (“ABI Commission”) found that the
number of Chapter 11 cases filed by individuals has increased dramatically since 2006,
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2020
See Bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (2018).
2
H.R. REP. NO. 116-171, at 2 (2019).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
See Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 166 (1991) (“The plain language of the Bankruptcy Code permits
individual debtors not engaged in business to file for relief under Chapter 11.”). Indeed, a national study of
individual Chapter 11 bankruptcies found that “[i]ndividuals file around 30% of all Chapter 11 filings.” See
also Richard M. Hynes, Anne Lawton, & Margaret Howard, National Study of Individual Chapter 11
Bankruptcies, 25 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 61, 65 (2017).
1
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a trend the Commission attributed to “[an] increase in the number of individuals
needing the bankruptcy remedy but precluded from filing under Chapter 13 because of
statutory debt limits.”9 This increase “[has] led many to question the adequacy and
suitability of Chapter 11 for individual debtors.”10 A paramount concern is the
applicability of the “absolute priority rule” in individual-debtor Chapter 11 cases.11 If
applicable, the rule effectively precludes confirmation of an individual debtor’s plan
of reorganization if an unsecured creditor will not be paid in full.12 Yet, the ABI
Commission underscored that, “[c]urrently, there is no judicial consensus on whether
(and to what extent) the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
(“BAPCPA”) amendments abrogated the absolute priority rule by excepting postpetition property and earnings from amended Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).”13 A majority
of courts have adopted the so-called “narrow view” that the BAPCPA amendments
abrogated the absolute priority rule only as to post-petition assets incorporated into the
estate by Section 1115.14 Some courts, however, adhere to a different view—the socalled “broad view”—holding that the absolute priority rule no longer applies in
individual Chapter 11 cases.15
While the narrow view has taken hold as the clear majority position on this issue,
this Note reevaluates the broad view in light of Congress’s recent enactment of the
Small Business Reorganization Act (“SBRA”) in August 2019.16 The SBRA adds a
new Subchapter to Chapter 11 of the Code, intended to improve the reorganization
process for debtors qualifying as small business debtors (which, as will be discussed,
includes qualified individual debtors).17 Among the changes implemented by the
SBRA is the unambiguous elimination of the absolute priority rule.18 If the absolute
priority rule does not apply to individuals under the new SBRA provisions, why should
it apply to individuals in a traditional individual-debtor Chapter 11 case? This Note
contends that it should not.
This Note looks first at how an individual debtor finds him or herself proceeding
under Chapter 11. As such, this Note briefly discusses the conventional forms of relief
for individual debtors, namely Chapters 7 and 13, before turning to the Chapter 11
alternative. The focus of this Note then shifts to the requirements for confirmation of
a debtor’s plan of reorganization in what is known as a cram-down process, and, more
specifically, the fair and equitable requirement for a cram-down. To that end, this Note
provides background on the fair and equitable requirement, the development of the
9
ABI COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
OTHER ISSUES RELATED TO CHAPTER 11 CASES, 317 (2014).
10
Id.
11
Id. at 318. See discussion infra pp. 7–17.
12
See In re Shat, 424 B.R. 854, 858 (Bankr. D. Nev 2010).
13
ABI COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 318. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”), Pub. L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, enacted April 20, 2005, is a legislative act that made
several significant changes to the United States Bankruptcy Code. Id.
14
See In re O’Neal, 490 B.R. 837, n. 9 (Bankr. W.D. Ark 2013) (listing courts adhering to the narrow
view).
15
Id. at n. 8 (listing courts adhering to the broad view).
16
Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-54, 133 Stat. 1079.
17
Id.; See discussion infra p. 18.
18
Small Business Reorganizations Act § 1191; See discussion infra pp. 18–20.
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absolute priority rule, and the challenges that the rule created for individual debtors
following the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Next, this Note addresses the 2005
BAPCPA amendments. As mentioned, following the BAPCPA amendments, a split
in authority emerged regarding the meaning of amended Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)’s
individual-debtor exception. This Note carefully considers the arguments for both the
narrow and broad view of the exception and the impact the exception has in individualdebtor cases. Lastly, this Note examines the expected impact of the SBRA. In light
of the SBRA’s elimination of the absolute priority rule, this Note argues that
bankruptcy courts should reconsider the broad view in traditional individual-debtor
Chapter 11 cases.
I. CONVENTIONAL RELIEF FOR INDIVIDUAL DEBTORS: CHAPTERS 7 & 13
Individuals who find themselves insolvent or in financial distress, and considering
filing for bankruptcy, primarily have three options: Chapter 7, Chapter 13, and Chapter
11.19 Chapter 7 is best considered a last resort. This is because Chapter 7 does not
involve the filing of a plan of repayment as in Chapter 13, or a plan of reorganization
as in Chapter 11.20 Instead, Chapter 7 involves a complete liquidation: “[t]he
bankruptcy trustee [appointed by the bankruptcy court] gathers and sells the debtor's
nonexempt assets and uses the proceeds of such assets to pay holders of claims (i.e.,
creditors) in accordance with the provisions of [the Code].”21 Thus, besides the exempt
property specified by the Code or the laws of the debtor’s home state, a debtor will
usually lose property.22 In order to avoid this result, qualified individual debtors may
find Chapter 13 to be a useful alternative.
Chapter 13—commonly referred to as a wage earner’s plan—“enables individuals
with regular income to develop a plan to repay all or part of their debts.”23 This
repayment plan provides debtors the ability to make regular payments of fixed amounts
to the trustee appointed by the court over the course of three to five years.24 Thus,
19
It is also worth noting that some individual debtors may be eligible for Chapter 12 relief. Chapter 12 Bankr. Basics, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/Chapter-12bankruptcy-basics (last visited Nov. 24, 2019). Congress designed Chapter 12 for "family farmers" or "family
fishermen" with "regular annual income" by combining aspects of Chapter 11 and Chapter 13. Id. Chapter 12
is substantially similar to Chapter 13, in that it “enables financially distressed family farmers and fishermen to
propose and carry out a plan to repay all or part of their debts” over a three to five-year commitment period.
Id. Moreover, like Chapter 13, Chapter 12 eliminates the absolute priority rule, imposing a “best interest of
creditors” test instead. Id. However, Chapter 12 is better tailored to the needs of family farmers and
fisherman, because Chapter 13 was “designed for wage earners who have smaller debts than those facing
family farmers.” Id.
20
Chapter 7 - Bankr. Basics, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/servicesforms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/Chapter-7-bankruptcy-basics (last visited Nov. 24, 2019).
21
Id.
22
The Bankruptcy Code and the laws of most states allow debtors to keep a certain amount of equity in
the debtor’s home, personal property, such as a car, if the exemption covers the remaining equity in the
property, retirement accounts, and some wages, as well as most household goods and clothing. See Cara
O’Neill, Exemptions in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/propertyexemptions-Chapter-7-bankruptcy.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2019).
23
Chapter 13 - Bankr. Basics, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/servicesforms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/Chapter-13-bankruptcy-basics (last visited November 24, 2019).
24
Id.
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much like Chapter 11, “[t]he focus of Chapter 13 is [the] confirmation of a plan.”25
After the debtor proposes a plan, “creditors and the Chapter 13 trustee have the
opportunity to object to it.”26 The court then considers whether the plan complies with
the requirements for the contents of a Chapter 13 plan (found primarily in Section
1322) and the requirements for confirmation of the plan (found in Section 1325).27 As
this Note will discuss below, the template for the individual-debtor Chapter 11
provisions implemented by the BAPCPA amendments in 2005, “was to adopt and
adapt as much of Chapter 13 as possible with respect to individual debtors in Chapter
11.”28 Therefore, it will be helpful to briefly describe Chapter 13’s confirmation
requirements with respect to unsecured claims.
A Chapter 13 plan may modify unsecured claims.29 “Modification occurs if the
plan provides for anything other than immediate payment in full.”30 Indeed, “Chapter
13 plans frequently modify unsecured claims by providing for payment of only a
portion of the total debt.”31 In order to confirm a plan where a modification is
proposed, however, the amount the debtor proposes to pay must meet the “best interest
of creditors” test of Section 1325(a)(4) and, potentially, the projected disposable
income test of Section 1325(b).32 “The best interest of creditors test . . . requires that
each unsecured creditor receive distributions with a value as of the effective date of
the plan equal at least to the amount that the creditor would receive if the debtor's assets
were liquidated in a Chapter 7 case.”33 If all of the requirements of Section 1325(a),
including the best interest of creditors test, are satisfied, “the court must confirm the
plan unless there is an objection that invokes the ‘projected disposable income test’ of
Section 1325(b).”34 If so, then the plan must also satisfy that test.35 Specifically,
Section 1325(b)(1) provides:
If the trustee or the holder of any unsecured claim objects to the
confirmation of the plan, then the court may not approve the plan
25
HON. W. HOMER DRAKE JR., HON. PAUL W. BONAPFEL, & ADAM M. GOODMAN, CHAPTER 13
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1:1 (June 2019 Update).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
In re Shat, 424 B.R. 854, 862 (Bankr. D. Nev 2010).
29
11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(4) (2018). “Unsecured claims are generally those for which the creditor has no
special rights to collect against particular property owned by the debtor.” DRAKE, et al., supra note 25, § 7:1.
Unsecured claims are junior to priority claims and secured claims. Chapter 13 – Bankr. Basics, supra note 23.
“Priority claims are those granted special status by the bankruptcy law, such as most taxes and the costs of
bankruptcy proceeding.” DRAKE, et al., supra note 25, § 7:1. Generally, priority claims must be repaid in full.
Chapter 13 – Bankr. Basics, supra note 23. “Secured claims are those for which the creditor has the right take
back certain property (i.e., the collateral) if the debtor does not pay the underlying debt.” DRAKE, et al., supra
note 25, § 7:1. Generally, secured claims “must provide that the holder of the secured claim receive at least
the value of the collateral.” Id. The treatment of priority claims and secured claims under Chapter 13 is
similar to the treatment of such claims under Chapter 11.
30
DRAKE et al., supra note 25, § 7:2.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. “The best interest test thus requires calculation of what an unsecured creditor would receive in a
hypothetical Chapter 7 case from the liquidation of the debtor's assets after payment of secured and priority
claims.” Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
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unless . . . (A) the value of the property to be distributed under the
plan on account of such claim is not less than the amount of the claim;
or (B) the plan provides that all of the debtor’s projected disposable
income to be received in the applicable commitment period . . . will
be applied to make payments to unsecured creditors of the plan.36
Yet, so long as these requirements—the best interest of creditors test and, if
applicable, the projected disposable income test—are met (and the plan is proposed in
good faith) “[the] plan is confirmable even if it provides for nominal, or even no,
payments to unsecured creditors.”37 Critically, this means that the debtor may also
retain property, even if a class of unsecured creditors is impaired by the plan. In other
words, Chapter 13 contains no absolute priority rule.38
In re Ruggles is illustrative.39 In that case the debtor, Darlene Ruggles
(“Ruggles”), owned a duplex worth approximately $125,000 that was encumbered by
a secured claim of $75,000.40 Ruggles filed a Chapter 13 petition and then “proceeded
to claim a $50,000 homestead exemption in the entire equity of the duplex.”41
Although unsecured creditors held claims in the amount of $59,115, Ruggles’s
repayment plan provided that all of her projected disposable income received during
the three year commitment period—just $6,327 (only slightly more than ten percent of
the total unsecured claims)—would be applied to make payments to the unsecured
creditors.42 However, because the duplex would have been exempt under a Chapter 7
liquidation, the unsecured creditors would purportedly receive $500 more under the
repayment plan than they would have received in a hypothetical liquidation.43 The
bankruptcy court noted that “the sole purpose of the plan [was] to retain exempt and
non-exempt assets while paying a minimal return to unsecured creditors,” but
nevertheless confirmed Ruggles’s plan, finding that it was filed in good faith, was in
the best interest of her creditors, and satisfied the projected disposable income test.44
Under Chapter 11, on the other hand, Ruggles’s plan would have inevitably
violated the absolute priority rule—Ruggles retained her interest in the duplex even
though the unsecured creditors neither accepted the plan nor were they to be repaid in
full under the plan.45 Consequently, individual debtors typically prefer Chapter 13 to
Chapter 11. But not all individual debtors are eligible for Chapter 13 relief; some may
be forced to contend with the absolute priority rule under Chapter 11.
36
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) (2018) (emphasis added). “Generally, projected disposable income is the
difference between ‘current monthly income,’ calculated in accordance with its statutory definition, less
permitted expenditures. The ‘applicable commitment period’ is three years for a debtor with current monthly
income below the applicable median income in the debtor's state for a family of the same size as the debtor's
household and five years if it is above the applicable median income, unless the plan provides for payment of
unsecured claims in full within a shorter time.” DRAKE, et al., supra note 25, § 7:2.
37
DRAKE, et al., supra note 25 at § 7:2.
38
Id.
39
In re Ruggles 210 B.R. 57 (Bankr. D. Vermont 1997).
40
Id. at 59.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 59, 61.
45
See discussion infra at p. 11–17.
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II. THE CHAPTER 11 ALTERNATIVE
A.

INDIVIDUAL-DEBTOR CHAPTER 11 CASES

Individual-debtor Chapter 11 cases usually involve debtors with complex financial
affairs or a home mortgage balance exceeding Chapter 13’s limit on secured debt.46 In
fact, Professor Richard Hynes, et al., made the following findings about the typical
profile of an individual Chapter 11 debtor:
Chapter 11 debtors are much more likely to operate a business, and
they have dramatically higher debt-to-income ratios than other
consumer debtors . . . . As expected, Chapter 11 debtors have much
higher household incomes than individuals in Chapters 7 or 13, but
their expenses also are quite large. Real estate debt plays a
particularly prominent role, which, unsurprisingly is especially true
of the filings made in 2010.47
At the same time, however, Professor Hynes, et al., found that “the vast majority
of [these] debtors have a small number of creditors. Half have liabilities that fall below
the liability threshold for small business debtors and assets and liabilities that fall far
below the $10 million cutoff that the American Bankruptcy Commission recently
recommended for small and medium sized enterprises.”48 Thus, despite having more
complex financial affairs or slightly larger debts, Professor Hynes, et al., writes, “it
makes little sense to apply very different rules” to individuals with otherwise similar
characteristics depending on whether they file under Chapter 11 or Chapter 13.49
Yet, in a majority of jurisdictions, a different rule—the absolute priority rule—is
applied depending on whether an individual debtor files under Chapter 11 or Chapter
13. In Chapter 13, the absolute priority rule simply does not exist. In Chapter 11,
however, application of the rule sometimes proves fatal to individual debtors’ chances
of confirming a plan of reorganization. In fact, in those jurisdictions adhering to a
narrow view of Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)’s individual-debtor exception, individual
debtors are less likely to succeed at confirming a plan of reorganization than individual
debtors in jurisdictions adhering to the broad view.50 This, in turn, contributes to
disparity between the success rates for individual debtors in Chapter 11 and Chapter

46
PRACTICAL LAW BANKRUPTCY AND RESTRUCTURING, INDIVIDUAL CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY:
OVERVIEW (n.d.), Westlaw W-008-8977. “Only an individual with regular income that owes, on the date of
the filing of the petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of less than $250,000 and noncontingent,
liquidated, secured debts of less than $750,000 . . . may be a debtor under Chapter 13 of this title.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 109(e) (2018).
47
Hynes et al., supra note 8, at 66.
48
Id. at 67.
49
Id. at 66.
50
Id. at 132–35.
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13.51 In order to understand why and how the rule applies to individual debtors in
Chapter 11, it is first critical to understand Chapter 11’s cram-down confirmation
requirements.
B.

SECTION 1129 AND THE CONFIRMATION CONUNDRUM

A debtor’s plan of reorganization can generally be confirmed in two ways.52
“Most plans are confirmed consensually under Section 1129(a),” in which case “every
impaired class has voted to accept the plan of reorganization.”53 However, when a
debtor cannot confirm a plan consensually under Section 1129(a) because one or more
impaired classes have not accepted the plan proposed by the debtor, one potential
alternative is nonconsensual confirmation through the “cram-down” provisions set
forth in Section 1129(b).54 In order for the court to confirm a plan of reorganization in
a cram-down, the debtor must request that the court confirm the plan in a cram-down
procedure and satisfy three substantive requirements.55 “The first substantive
requirement is that all the requirements of [Section] 1129(a) must be satisfied, except
for [Section] 1129(a)(8).”56 Second, the plan must not discriminate unfairly against
dissenting classes.57 Third, “the plan must be fair and equitable with respect to
dissenting classes.”58 The “fair and equitable” requirement is the primary focus of this
Note. In order for a plan to be fair and equitable with respect to a dissenting class of
unsecured creditors, the plan must not violate the absolute priority rule: “a dissenting
class of unsecured creditors must be provided for in full before any junior class of
unsecured creditors can receive or retain property under a reorganization plan.”59
i. The Fair and Equitable Requirement: Origins of The Absolute Priority Rule and
The New Value Exception
“The absolute priority rule initially was a judicially created concept, arising from
a series of early twentieth-century railroad cases, including Northern Pacific Railway
Co. v. Boyd.”60 In Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd, the Northern Pacific Railroad
(the “Railroad”) purchased the stake of the majority shareholder of the Coeur d'Alene
Railway (“Coeur”).61 After the purchase, the Railroad apparently began to struggle
51

Id. at 68. Hynes et al., found evidence that “approximately 39% of debtors [in their study] confirmed
plans, while recent national data put [] Chapter 13 confirmation rates at about 70%.” Id. (citing Ed Flynn,
Chapter 13 Case Outcomes by State, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Aug. 2014 at 40, 41).
52
MARK S. SCARBERRY ET AL., BUSINESS REORGANIZATION IN BANKRUPTCY 994 (4th ed. 2012).
53
Id.
54
Id. at 1017.
55
Id.
56
Id.; See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2018).
57
SCARBERRY ET AL., supra note 52, at 1092.
58
Id. at 1018. In a cram-down pursuant to § 1129(b)(1), secured creditors and unsecured creditors are
dealt with separately. Section 1129(b)(2)(A) addresses secured creditors. This Note focuses on the treatment
of unsecured creditors, which is addressed in § 1129(b)(2)(B).
59
Nw. Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 202 (1988).
60
In re Friedman, 466 B.R. 471, 478 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012), overruled by Zachary v. Cal. Bank & Tr.,
811 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2016).
61
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 484–85 (1913).

378

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 46:2]

financially, and, in 1893, creditors brought a bill of insolvency against the Railroad
and the Coeur line.62 In 1895, however, as the result of an agreement between the
Railroad's shareholders and mortgage bondholders, the mortgage holders began
foreclosure proceedings against the Railroad’s assets.63 In 1899, the line's property
was sold at foreclosure for $220,000 to the newly organized Northern Pacific Railway
Company.64 Under the agreement, the new railway company was to purchase the
property of the old railroad, issue more bonds, use part of the money from these bonds
to pay the receiver's certificates from the insolvency proceeding, purchase new
equipment, and make some improvements to the lines.65 The balance of the bond
money was used to purchase the bonds of the old company.66 In addition, the new
railroad issued preferred and common stocks to pay the debts of some of the
subsidiaries for which the railroad was liable, the expenses of the reorganization, and
to redeem the stock of the older railroad.67 No provisions, however, were made for
any payment to creditors other than the bondholders.68 Consequently, unsecured
creditors brought a suit asking that the court enjoin the foreclosure sale as a conspiracy
between the bondholders and the stockholders to exclude the general creditors.69
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court was persuaded that the undertaking
was a conspiracy between the secured creditors of the railroad and the company's
stockholders to benefit their individual interests at the expense of the general
creditors.70 The Court found that the shareholders had joined forces with the
bondholders to “reorganize” in a way that left the unsecured creditors without payment
or remedy.71 The Court therefore “adopted the absolute priority rule to prevent deals
between senior creditors and equity holders that would impose unfair terms on
unsecured creditors.”72 In the decades since the Boyd decision “the . . . concern . . .
that the equity owners or senior debt holders might act separately or in combination to
extinguish the rights of junior creditors, has been the driving force behind judicial
scrutiny of plans of reorganization under federal law where the absolute priority rule
has arisen.”73
In 1978, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which, among
comprehensive reforms, codified the absolute priority rule in Chapter 11 of the Code
under Section 1129(b)(2)(B).74 As it existed then, Section 1129(b)(2)(B) read:
With respect to a class of unsecured claims, (i) the plan provides that
each holder of a claim of such class receive or retain on account of
62

Id. at 487.
Id. at 488.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 488.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 488–89.
69
Id. at 489.
70
Id. at 490.
71
175 A.L.R. Fed. 485, § 3 (Originally published in 2002).
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 1129(b)(2)(B), 92 Stat 2549 (1978).
63
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such claim property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan,
equal to the allowed amount of such claim; or (ii) the holder of any
claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such class will not
receive or retain on account of such junior claim or interest any
property.75
In the wake of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, the question arose whether a Chapter 11
debtor could ever confirm a plan while retaining an interest in property.
In 1988, the United States Supreme Court took up this question in the case of
Northwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers.76 Fittingly enough, respondents—the
Ahlers—were individual debtors operating a failing family farm in Minnesota.77
Between 1965 and 1984, the Ahlers had obtained several secured loans from
petitioners, Northwest Bank Worthington (“Northwest Bank”).78 Then, “in November
1984, respondents defaulted on their loan payments to . . . [Northwest Bank] . . . .”79
In order to avoid repossession of the collateral securing the loans, the Ahlers sought
the protection of Chapter 11.80 In response, Northwest Bank sought relief from the
automatic stay, arguing that the absolute priority rule would have prevented
confirmation of any plan under which the Ahlers retained their farm because without
the farm to generate cash flows no plan of reorganization would be successful.81
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Northwest Bank’s argument.82
Notwithstanding the absolute priority rule, the circuit court held that the absolute
priority rule did not bar respondents from retaining their equity interest in the farm if
they contributed “money or money's worth” to the reorganized enterprise.83 The circuit
court further concluded that Ahlers' “yearly contributions of labor, experience, and
expertise” would constitute a contribution of “money or money's worth,” and would
permit confirmation of a reorganization plan over petitioners' objections.”84 In
reaching this conclusion, the circuit court relied on dicta in the Supreme Court’s
decision in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.85 There, the Court posited the
existence of a so-called “new value exception” to the absolute priority rule:
It is, of course, clear that there are circumstances under which
stockholders may participate in a plan of reorganization of an
insolvent debtor . . . . [W]e believe that to accord ‘the creditor of his
full right of priority against the corporate assets' where the debtor is
insolvent, the stockholder's participation must be based on a
75

Id.
Nw. Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
77
Id. at 199.
78
Id.
79
Id. “[T]he aggregate loan balance owed the petitioners exceeded $1 million.” Id. at 200.
80
Id. at 200.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 200.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 201.
85
Case v. L.A. Lumber Prod. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
76
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contribution in money or money's worth, reasonably equivalent in
view of all the circumstances to the participation of the stockholder.86
Although the circuit court had found that such an exception was applicable to the
Ahlers’ situation, the Supreme Court disagreed.87 In an opinion in which all of the
justices joined (except Justice Kennedy, who took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case), the Court held that the absolute priority rule applied, and that
“respondents' promise of future labor warranted no exception to its operation.”88
Turning first to the statutory language and legislative history of Section
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), the Court concluded that Congress did not intend to liberalize the
absolute priority rule when it was codified.89 The Court reasoned that Congress had
explicitly rejected a proposal by the Bankruptcy Commission to “modify the absolute
priority rule to permit equity holders to participate in a reorganized enterprise based
on their contribution of ‘continued management . . . essential to the business’ or other
participation beyond ‘money or money's worth.’”90 Further, according to the Court,
even assuming that an equity holder might be able to retain property under the plan in
the event that he or she makes a contribution in money or money's worth, respondents’
promise of future services was not such a contribution.91
Having decided that the Ahlers’ promise of future services was not a contribution
of money or money’s worth, the Court then addressed an argument advanced by the
Ahlers that “the absolute priority rule has no application . . . where the property which
the junior interest holders wish to retain has no value to the senior unsecured
creditors.”92 The Court rejected this so-called “no value” theory, finding that:
Even where debts far exceed the current value of assets, a debtor who
retains his equity interest in [an] enterprise retains “property.”
Whether the value is present or prospective, for dividends or only for
purposes of control, a retained equity interest is a property interest to
which the creditors [are] entitled . . . before the stockholders [can]
retain it for any purpose whatever.93
Perhaps the most important passage of the Ahlers opinion for purposes of this
Note though, is that in which the Court acknowledges the then recently enacted Family

86

Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 203 (citing L.A. Lumber Prod. Co., 308 U.S. at 121–22) (emphasis added).
Id. at 202 (1988).
88
Id. at 206.
89
Id. at 205.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 204 (“A promise of future services is intangible, inalienable, and, in all likelihood,
unenforceable. It ‘has no place in the asset column of the balance sheet of the new [entity]’ . . . Unlike ‘money
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Farmers Bankruptcy Act of 1986.94 That Act created the Chapter 12 bankruptcy
proceeding.95 Notably, the Court pointed out that “one of Congress' principal concerns
in adopting Chapter 12 was the difficulties farmers encountered in seeking to
reorganize under Chapter 11.”96 Yet, the Court continued: “as respondents concede,
the Court of Appeals' decision here creates a method of proceeding under Chapter 11
which is far more advantageous to farmers than is Chapter 12.”97 Finding such a state
of affairs unlikely, the Court refused to believe “that Congress created, in Chapter 12,
an option for farm reorganizations less accessible to most farmers than current Chapter
11 proceedings.”98 On the contrary, the Court held: “where Congress adopts a new
law . . . [it] normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation
given to the [old] law.”99
The Supreme Court later returned to the issue of the new value exception in
Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association v. 203 North LaSalle Street
Partnership.100 In that case, the impaired creditor-bank took the position that the plan
could not be confirmed as a cram-down because old equity holders would receive
property despite the fact that the bank’s unsecured deficiency claim would not be paid
in full—i.e., the absolute priority rule would be violated.101 The debtor-partnership
responded that the plan satisfied the new value exception because “in exchange for the
partnership’s entire ownership of the reorganized debtor . . . certain former partners of
the Debtor would contribute $6.125 million in new capital.” 102 The Court, however,
declined to decide whether the absolute priority included a new value exception, and,
instead, held on narrower grounds that the proposed plan failed to satisfy Section
1129(b)(2)(B).103
Explaining why the debtor’s plan failed to satisfy the statute, the Court focused on
the fact that “[b]efore the debtor’s plan was accepted no one else could propose an
alternative one, and after its acceptance no one else could obtain equity in the
reorganized entity.”104 Consequently, the result of such a plan would be that “at the
moment of the plan’s approval the debtor’s partners necessarily enjoyed an exclusive
opportunity . . . .”105 Thus, the Court believed that this opportunity should be treated
as the retention of a property right, in violation of the absolute priority rule.106 The
Court reasoned:
If the price to be paid for the equity interest is the best obtainable, old
equity does not need the protection of exclusiveness (unless to trump
94
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an equal offer from someone else); if it is not the best, there is no
apparent reason for giving old equity a bargain. There is no reason,
that is, unless the very purpose of the whole transaction is, at least in
part, to do old equity a favor. And that, of course, is to say that old
equity would obtain its opportunity, and the resulting benefit, because
of old equity’s prior interest within the meaning of [the absolute
priority rule]. Hence it is that the exclusiveness of the opportunity,
with its protection against the market’s scrutiny of the purchase price
by means of competing bids or even competing plan proposals,
renders the partners’ right a property interest extended “on account
of” the old equity position and therefore subject to an unpaid senior
creditor class’s objection.107
The primary takeaway from 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, therefore, is
that a “new value plan cannot be confirmed if the old equity holders are the only ones
given an opportunity to bid on the debtor’s ownership interests.”108 Thus, even if it is
possible to take advantage a new value exception, such exception is narrowly
construed. Consequently, after the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, the
absolute priority rule, in combination with the narrowness of the new value exception,
quickly made apparent that individual Chapter 11 debtors were extraordinarily
unlikely to be able to confirm a plan of reorganization if a dissenting class of unsecured
creditors was impaired.
ii. Pre-BAPCPA Plans of Reorganization for Individuals—Practically
Unconfirmable!
In the years following the 1978 reforms, it became clear that the application
of Section 1129(b)(2)(B) imposed a serious impediment to reorganization. In fact,
application of the absolute priority rule effectively meant that no individual debtor
could ever confirm a Chapter 11 plan if an unsecured creditor would not be paid in
full.109 Consequently, individual debtors filing under Chapter 11 were left searching
for arguments that would allow them to circumvent the rule and retain property.
In In re Davis, for instance, the debtors argued,
It makes no sense to apply the rule in individual cases for two
fundamental reasons: first, that the rule was developed in the context
of corporate or partnership cases where equity “interests” are held by
third parties, not by the debtors themselves; and, second, that it is
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impossible to apply without, in effect, denying meaningful Chapter
11 relief to individual debtors.110
In that case, the debtor’s plan of reorganization proposed that the debtors would retain
rent-producing properties, distributions from which would be used to fund the
repayment of unsecured creditors.111 Moreover, the plan provided that if the Court
determined that “a contribution of new value was necessary for confirmation,” then
the debtors would “agree to contribute $100,000 of non-estate funds as their new-value
contribution,” provided, however, that they would “reserve the right to liquidate the
properties.”112 The plan also stated that the purpose of the new value would be to
ensure timely performance of their obligations under the plan and “to avoid adverse
tax consequences which might arise from the sale or disposition of the properties.”113
The plan was rejected by one class of creditors, but otherwise satisfied the
requirements for a cram-down under Section 1129(a)(10).114 The objecting class
argued that the debtors' plan could not be confirmed because it violated 203 North
LaSalle Street Partnership.115
In support of the plan, the debtors argued that under Toibb v. Radloff,116 the
absolute priority rule should not apply to individual, nonbusiness debtors.117
Specifically, the Debtors argued that “applying the rule to individual debtors would
result in undesirable forced asset sales not otherwise contemplated by the structure of
Chapter 11.”118 Because this result is irrational in individual-debtor cases, they argued,
the court should ignore the rule.119 The bankruptcy court disagreed.120 The court did
not dispute that Toibb stands primarily for the proposition that certain provisions in
Chapter 11 have little application to nonbusiness debtors, but concluded that the
absolute priority rule is not among those provisions.121 Instead, relying primarily on
Ahlers, the court held that the absolute priority rule applied even in the case of an
individual debtor.122 The court explained: “[t]he fact that the application of the law to
a certain situation may be inconvenient or painful does not justify ignoring a clearly
relevant statute and those cases at all levels that have interpreted it.”123
Moreover, the court addressed the debtors’ argument that the plan fell within the
new-value exception.124 The court found that even though the plan provided that the
debtors could contribute $100,000 of non-estate funds as their new-value contribution,
the plan did not provide for competing plans or any other mechanism for entities to
110
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compete with the new value proposed by the debtors.125 Consequently, the proposed
plan would necessarily fail the so-called “market” or “nonexclusive” test established
in 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership.126 Consequently, the debtors’ plan of
reorganization could not be confirmed.
In re Davis is just one among many individual-debtor cases in which the debtors
failed to confirm a plan or reorganization because of the barrier imposed by the
absolute priority rule and the narrowly construed new-value exception.127 Simply
stated, prior to enactment of BAPCPA in 2005, it was incredibly difficult to perceive
how an individual Chapter 11 debtor could meet the requirements of the new-value
exception, and thereby maintain an interest in the estate despite the absolute priority
rule. The 2005 BAPCPA amendments, however, provided new hope for individual
debtors proceeding under Chapter 11.
iii. Individual Debtors After BAPCPA—Still Unconfirmable?
In 2005, Congress completed a comprehensive overhaul of the Code by enacting
the Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act (“BAPCPA”).128 As part of
BAPCPA, Congress enacted a host of changes applicable in individual-debtor Chapter
11 cases.129 “[M]ost of the changes . . . were part of an overall design of adapting
various Chapter 13 provisions to fit in Chapter 11.”130 In fact, courts and commentators
have pointed out that the individual-debtor provisions the BAPCPA implemented
“operate in ways very similar to Chapter 13 [provisions].”131 One such change was an
amendment to Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).132 The statute now reads:
(ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of
such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such
junior claim or interest any property, except that in a case in which
the debtor is an individual, the debtor may retain property included
in the estate under [Section] 1115, subject to the requirements of
Subsection (a)(14) of this Section.133
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After the BAPCPA amendments, the additional clause creating an exception for
individual debtors has been a source of controversy. “[The] clause obviously modifies
the absolute priority rule . . . . The question is, how extensive is the modification?”134
One interpretation of the additional clause is that it effectively abrogates the
absolute priority rule.135 This would, of course, accord with the idea that Congress
sought to mirror Chapter 13 because, as previously discussed, there is no absolute
priority rule under Chapter 13. Professor Robert Landry and others have argued that
Congress recognized the barrier the absolute priority rule previously imposed for
individual Chapter 11 debtors, and amended Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) with the
intention of making confirmation of a plan in an individual-debtor Chapter 11 case
easier.136 According to adherents of this interpretation, the conclusion that the
BAPCPA amendments abrogated the absolute priority rule is supported both by a
plain-language reading of Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) and the thrust of the overall
statutory scheme.137
Recall first that in order to confirm a plan in a cram-down procedure, the debtor
must initially meet all of the applicable requirements of Section 1129(a), except for
Subsection (a)(8).138 Notably, as part of the BAPCPA Congress amended Section
1129(a) by adding paragraph (15), which provides:
(15) In a case in which the debtor is an individual and in which
the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the confirmation
of the plan—
(A) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of the property
to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less
than the amount of such claim; or
(B) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan is
not less than the projected disposable income of the debtor (as
defined in Section 1325(b)(2)) to be received during the 5-year period
beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the plan, or
during the period for which the plan provides payments, whichever
is longer.139
The new paragraph imports the disposable-income test available under Chapter 13
into Chapter 11 for individual debtors.140 Thus, under the amended individual-debtor
confirmation requirements, a plan need not provide for full payment, or otherwise
attempt to avoid operation of the absolute priority rule by satisfying the new-value
exception, in order to be confirmed.141 An individual debtor may, instead, “commit
134
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value equal to five years’ worth of earnings to the plan . . . .”142 It follows, however,
that the debtor must have some income or earnings to commit. “Debtors in many
individual Chapter 11 cases have a prepetition ownership interest in a business that is
their primary source of income.”143 Some such debtors will necessarily continue to
depend on their prepetition business assets to generate income.144 Indeed, “[i]t would
be ‘illogical’ to require individual debtors to devote five years of disposable income to
their plans, but remove the debtors' [primary] means of providing that income.”145
Therefore, it makes sense to read Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) as eliminating the absolute
priority rule and enabling individual debtors to retain their prepetition assets.
Courts that read Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) as eliminating the absolute priority
rule do so by relying on a broad reading (thus, the broad view) of the phrase, “included
in the estate under Section 1115.”146 Section 1115—also added by the BAPCPA
amendments—provides, in part:
In a case in which the debtor is an individual, property of the
estate includes, in addition to the property specified in Section 541—
(1) all property of the kind specified in Section 541 that the
debtor acquires after commencement of the case . . . ; and
(2) earnings from services performed by the debtor after the
commencement of the case . . . .147
In In re Shat, the bankruptcy court persuasively explained:
Section 1115 thus defines property of the estate for an individual
Chapter 11 debtor via a two-step process. Initially, Section 1115
creates a baseline estate of all the property covered by Section 541.
It then adds to that one class of property excluded for other Chapter
11’s by Section 541(a)(6): postpetition income from services.148
The phrase, “included in the estate under Section 1115,” can therefore be read broadly
to “refer to all property Section 1115 itself references, and this would then be a
reference to the superset of Section 541(a) property and the debtor’s postpetition
service income.”149 As a result, under the broad view an individual debtor can retain
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the entirety of the bankruptcy estate as property, thus effectively abrogating the
absolute priority rule in individual-debtor Chapter 11 cases.150
Nevertheless, a majority of courts have rejected the notion that Congress intended
to abrogate the absolute priority rule altogether, and have instead interpreted the phrase
“included in the estate under Section 1115” much more narrowly (thus, the narrow
view).151 In Zachary v. California Bank & Trust, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
explained:
Courts applying the narrow view . . . hold that the BAPCPA
amendments merely have the effect of allowing individual Chapter
11 debtors to retain property and earnings acquired after the
commencement of the case that would otherwise be excluded under
Section 541(a)(6) & (7). Under this view, an individual debtor may
not cram down a plan that would permit the debtor to retain
prepetition property that is not excluded from the estate by Section
541, but may cram down a plan that permits the debtor to retain only
postpetition property.152
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Zachary is representative of the arguments
generally made in support of the narrow view.153 The Zachary Court first held that the
term “include” was best defined as “to take in.”154 Thus, according to the court, Section
1129(b)(2)(b)(ii) naturally reads: the debtor may retain “property that Section 1115
takes into the estate.”155 “Under this reading,” the court stated, “what Section 1115
takes into the estate is property that the debtor acquires after the commencement of the
case;” property included in the estate by Section 541 is not “taken in” by Section
1115.156 The court reasoned that this reading created harmony between the new
individual-debtor exception and Section 1115.157 Moreover, the court found that the
narrow reading was supported by the history of the absolute priority rule and the
Supreme Court’s express warning against finding an implied repeal of provisions of
the Code—“such a major change in the existing rules would not likely have been made
without specific provision in the test of the statute; it is improbable that it would have
been made without even any mention in the legislative history.”158 Although the court
150

Id. at 865 (“Given the relatively straightforward reading of the statute supporting the broad reading,
and the general rehabilitative aim of Chapter 11 . . . [the construction of § 1115] leads to the position that §
1129(B)(2)(B)(ii) extends to all property of the estate . . . . This conclusion is supported by the revisions in
2005 to bring individual Chapter 11’s more in line with Chapter 13.”).
151
Mark A. Salzberg & Kate E. Thomas, Did BAPCPA Abolish Absolute Priority Rule for Individual
Debtors? 9th Circuit Gives Its View, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2016, at 40, 41.
152
Zachary v. Cal. Bank & Tr., 811 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Maharaj, 681 F.3d
558, 563 (4th Cir. 2012)) (internal quotations omitted).
153
Salzberg & Thomas, supra note 151, at 41.
154
Zachary, 811 F.3d at 1197 (citing Ice House Am., LLC v. Cardin, 751 F.3d 734, 738–39 (6th Cir.
2014)).
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 1198 (quoting United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S.
365, 380 (1988)).
158
Id. at 1199.

388

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 46:2]

recognized that “retaining the absolute priority rule . . . works a double whammy on
[individual debtors],”159 the circuit court resolved that Congress could have abrogated
the absolute priority rule in a far more straightforward manner if that was what
Congress intended.160 For example, the court reasoned, “[i]nstead of adding language
to Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), Congress simply could have made that provision
inapplicable to individual Chapter 11 reorganizations . . . [or] raised the debt limits for
Chapter 13 cases, ushering more individuals into that regime.”161
Although a majority of courts have adopted the narrow view, the broad view
should not be abandoned. At least one commentator has advanced salient arguments
for courts to adopt the broad view, and, further, for Congress to amend the Code to
abrogate the absolute priority rule for individual-debtor Chapter 11 cases in spite of
the prominence of the narrow view.162 Lee argues that “the congruence BAPCPA
created between individual debtors under Chapters 11 and 13” supports the assertion
that “Congress, at least in part, desired to treat individual Chapter 11 debtors like
Chapter 13 debtors.”163 Further, Lee concludes that “the broad view addresses
individual Chapter 11 cases through the lens of common sense . . . acknowledge[ing]
the symmetry Congress created between individual Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 cases .
. . [and] facilitate[ing] the goals of BAPCPA by protecting consumers’ ability to retain
valuable assets and therefore successfully reorganize.”164 Likewise, in In re O’Neal,
an Arkansas bankruptcy court concluded that “since there does not appear to be any
other logical reason for all of the changes made exclusively to Chapter 11 for
individuals except to make it work like Chapter 13,” the broad view—abrogating the
absolute priority rule in individual-debtor cases—should be adopted.165 Following the
enactment of the Small Business Reorganization Act in August 2019, it appears even
more illogical for courts to require compliance with the absolute priority rule in
individual-debtor Chapter 11 cases.
III. THE SMALL BUSINESS REORGANIZATION ACT OF 2019
On August 23, 2019, President Donald Trump signed the Small Business
Reorganization Act (the “SBRA”) into law, adding a new Subchapter—Subchapter
V—to Chapter 11.166 Touted as a bipartisan measure with support from various
nonpartisan organizations, the SBRA is intended to “streamline the bankruptcy process
by which small businesses (sic) debtors reorganize and rehabilitate their financial
159
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affairs.”167 The push for this legislation emerged from a “consensus view among
insolvency professionals . . . that the 2005 BAPCPA amendments did not ‘fix’ Chapter
11 for small businesses.”168 Indeed, both the National Bankruptcy Conference (the
“NBC”) and the American Bankruptcy Institute (the “ABI”) developed
recommendations to improve the reorganization process for small business debtors
under Chapter 11.169 The bill ultimately enacted into law (H.R. 3311) represents a
slightly revised version of a draft statute introduced by the NBC in 2010, and “the
House Report on H.R. 3311 credits both the NBC and ABI recommendations as the
inspiration for [the bill].”170 In order to accomplish its objective, the SBRA consists
of three principal features:
(1) [R]equiring the appointment of an individual to serve as the
trustee in a Chapter 11 case filed by a small business debtor . . . ; (2)
requiring such private trustee to monitor the debtor’s progress toward
confirmation of a reorganization plan; and (3) authorizing the court
to confirm a plan over the objection of a debtor’s creditors, providing
(sic) such plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and
equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is
impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.171
The third feature is of particular importance for the purpose of this Note. Like a
general Chapter 11 case, the SBRA authorizes the bankruptcy court to confirm a plan
over the objection of a debtor’s creditors, provided that, inter alia, the plan is fair and
equitable with respect to each impaired class.172 The requirements for a cram-down
confirmation under the SBRA, however, differ from Chapter 11’s general cram-down
requirements.
Critically, the absolute priority rule codified in Section
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) is not replicated.173
A.

NEW ALTERNATIVE FOR INDIVIDUAL DEBTORS

“Under the SBRA, a Section 101(51D) ‘small business debtor’ that files for
Chapter 11 relief has two options: (1) proceed as a Subchapter V case by affirmatively
electing Subchapter V, or (2) proceed as a BAPCPA ‘small business case’ by not
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electing Subchapter V.”174 As Ralph Brubaker has noted, however, “given the
relatively disadvantageous BAPCPA ‘small business case’ provisions, as compared to
the much more advantageous provisions of Subchapter V, it can be expected that
virtually all ‘small business debtors’ filing under Chapter 11 will elect to proceed under
Subchapter V, rather than as a Section 101(51C) ‘small business case.’”175 In addition
to being more advantageous for small businesses, the plan confirmation requirements
under Subchapter V are also more advantageous for qualified individual debtors.
The requirements for confirmation of a plan of reorganization under
Subchapter V are set out in Section 1191.176 Similar to Section 1129 in a general
Chapter 11 case, Section 1191 provides for both consensual confirmation and nonconsensual confirmation, i.e. a cram-down.177 “Confirmation of a consensual
Subchapter V under newly enacted 1191(a) is achieved according to the same
standards for and with the same effect as a confirmation [under Section 1129(a)].”178
In the case of a cram-down, however, newly enacted Section 1191(b) departs
substantially from Section 1129(b).179 Specifically, Section 1191(b) provides:
[I]f all of the applicable requirements of Section 1129(a) of this title,
other than paragraphs (8), (10), and (15) of that Section, are met with
respect to a plan, the court, on request of the debtor, shall confirm the
plan notwithstanding the requirements of such paragraphs if the plan
does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect
to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has
not accepted the plan.180
Section 1191(c), in turn, sets forth a rule of construction defining the requirements
for a plan to be fair and equitable.181 Importantly, with respect to a rejecting, impaired
class of unsecured creditors, a Subchapter V debtor may still confirm the plan by
meeting the “best efforts requirement” set forth in Section 1191(c)(2).182 That Section
requires:
(2) As of the effective date of the plan—
(A) the plan provides that all of the projected disposable income
of the debtor to be received in the 3-year period, or such longer
174
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period not to exceed 5 years as the court may fix, beginning on
the date that the first payment is due under the plan will be
applied to make payments under the plan; or
(B) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan in
the 3-year period, or such longer period not to exceed 5 years as
the court may fix, beginning on the date on which the first
distribution is due under the plan is not less than the projected
disposable income of the debtor.183
Brubaker has pointed out that Subchapter V’s best efforts requirement is
modeled on the disposable income tests applicable in Chapters 12 and 13 and in postBAPCPA individual-debtor Chapter 11 cases.184 However, Congress has made some
important modifications pertinent to individual debtors. Recall that in an individualdebtor Chapter 11 case, the disposable income test may be impracticable in
jurisdictions adhering to the narrow view where application of the absolute priority
rule prevents the debtor from retaining an interest in prepetition assets. In enacting
Subchapter V, Congress clearly recognized the difficulty that the absolute priority rule
caused small businesses (and, by extension, individuals) attempting to reorganize
under Chapter 11. Indeed, Congress eliminated the rule entirely—it is simply not
replicated in Section 1191(c)(2).185 As a result, “Subchapter V’s replacement of the .
. . absolute priority rule with a best-efforts requirement will enable small business
debtors [and individuals] to more easily reorganize under Chapter 11 without losing
ownership and control of their businesses.”186
While it is a step in the right direction that the SBRA will enable some individual
debtors to avoid the absolute priority rule by electing to proceed under Subchapter V,
the SBRA is only available to individual debtors that qualify for small business debtor
183
Pub. L. No. 116-54, 133 Stat. 1079, 1082 (2019) (enacting 11 U.S.C. § 1191). Section 1191(c) also
defines disposable income:

(d) Disposable income.--For purposes of this Section, the
term “disposable income” means the income that is received by
the debtor and that is not reasonably necessary to be expended-(1) for-(A) the maintenance or support of the
debtor or a dependent of the debtor; or
(B) a domestic support obligation
that first becomes payable after the date of
the filing of the petition; or
(2) for the payment of expenditures necessary
for the continuation, preservation, or operation of the
business of the debtor. Id.
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status.187 The Code, as amended by the SBRA, defines “small business debtor” as “a
person engaged in commercial or business activities . . . that has aggregate
noncontingent liquidated and unsecured debts . . . in an amount not more than
$2,725,625 . . . not less than fifty percent of which arose from the commercial or
business activities of the debtor . . . .”188 Consequently, not all individual debtors will
qualify as a small business debtor. In fact, according to one calculation, between 2008
and 2018, only about twenty-five percent of individual cases would have qualified for
the small-business-debtor election.189 Consequently, in the majority of jurisdictions
that adhere to the narrow view of Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)’s individual-debtor
exception, the resulting statutory scheme for reorganizing individual debtors will
become even more absurd. Individual debtors who qualify for Chapter 13, as well as
individual debtors who exceed the Chapter 13 debt limitation but otherwise qualify as
small business debtors under Subchapter V, can retain prepetition business assets to
fund a plan of reorganization. Individual debtors who exceed the debt limitations of
both Chapter 13 and Subchapter V, on the other hand, are left to suffer the implications
of the absolute priority rule.
IV. RECONSIDERING THE “BROAD VIEW” APPROACH
In In re Summers, the debtor, James Summers (“Summers”) reported unsecured
debt totaling $450,479.00—exceeding Chapter 13’s unsecured debt limitation.190
Instead of choosing to liquidate his assets under Chapter 7, Summers filed a voluntary
individual-debtor Chapter 11 petition, and, subsequently, a plan of reorganization.191
The plan impaired both of the two classes of unsecured claims, yet provided that Class
9—Summers’s own interest in his property—would be unimpaired.192 Consequently,
one of the classes of unsecured creditors voted to reject the plan based on the fact that
the plan violated the absolute priority rule.193 The bankruptcy court denied
confirmation of Summers’s plan, holding that under the narrow view of Section
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)’s individual-debtor exception, the absolute priority rule continues to
apply to the pre-petition property defined by Section 541.194 Curiously, however, had
the SBRA been effective at the time Summers filed his petition, he likely would have
been eligible as a small business debtor to take advantage of Subchapter V (assuming
Summers otherwise met all of the other requirements, his debts did not exceed
Subchapter V’s limitation). Had Summers been able to elect to proceed under
187
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Subchapter V rather than the traditional individual-debtor provisions he likely would
have found it to be an advantageous alternative: the absolute priority rule would be
inapplicable and the best-efforts requirement would be much less rigorous.195 It is
unclear why an individual debtor who is eligible for Chapter 13 or Subchapter V should
have the advantage of being able to retain pre-petition property, but an individual
debtor with debts slightly exceeding the debt limitation of Subchapter V should still
have to contend with the absolute priority rule.
Of course, as one commentator has explained, the debt limit for SBRA eligibility
will very likely increase sometime in the future.196 “The reality is that, as with Chapter
12, Congress is establishing a baseline from which to measure the SBRA's impact. . .
. It is hoped that the recommendations of ABI ($10 million) or the National
Bankruptcy Conference ($7.5 million) will be considered in the near future.”197 But in
the meantime the absolute priority rule will continue to serve as an impediment to the
overwhelming majority of individual-debtors that will not be eligible to proceed under
Subchapter V when it becomes effective in February 2020. Courts should, therefore,
reconsider the broad view of Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)’s individual-debtor exception.
Not only is the broad view supported by a logical, plain meaning interpretation of
the statute, but it is more sensible and responsive toward achieving a successful
reorganization in individual-debtor Chapter 11 cases. Indeed, Congress evidently
understands that abrogating the absolute priority rule is a key component of enabling
small business and individual debtors to more easily reorganize under Chapter 11
without losing ownership and control of their businesses. This is quite clear under the
SBRA, and, at least in the view of some courts, was apparent when Congress enacted
the BAPCPA amendments. As the courts have said repeatedly, “statutory language
cannot be construed in a vacuum. It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction
that the words of a statute be read in their context and with a view to their place in the
overall statutory scheme.”198 Subchapter V, as added by the SBRA, is largely modeled
after Chapter 12 and 13. Likewise, most of the changes effected by BAPCPA in
individual-debtor Chapter 11 cases were part of an overall design of adapting various
Chapter 13 provisions to fit Chapter 11. The common thread in these changes is the
goal of making it easier for small businesses and individuals to reorganize under
Chapter 11. The narrow view ignores this goal and renders Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)
wholly inconsistent with the overall statutory scheme merely because courts adhering
to this view refuse to believe that Congress would eliminate the absolute priority rule
in such a convoluted way. Yet, Congress’s intent to eliminate the absolute priority
rule is unambiguous under Subchapter V. Given the similarity of objectives between
the BAPCPA amendments and the SBRA, eliminating the absolute priority rule in
traditional individual-debtor Chapter 11 cases through adoption of the broad view is
certainly deserving of reconsideration by the courts.
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CONCLUSION
In light of the recent enactment of the Small Business Reorganization Act,
which eliminates the absolute priority rule, courts should reconsider the broad view of
Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)’s individual-debtor exception. The enactment of the SBRA,
which seeks to facilitate more successful reorganizations, reinforces the importance of
eliminating the absolute priority rule in traditional individual-debtor Chapter 11 cases
if such debtors are to successfully reorganize. Therefore, courts should consider the
SBRA when interpreting Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) and adopt the more sensible broad
view, thereby abrogating the absolute priority rule.

